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S ... E OF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAI )"s 
FILED ~ - (p - D?J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I. BACKGROUND. 
Case No. CV 20034621 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AND ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SUBSTITUTE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST 
Case No. CV 20027671 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Although one decision is being filed in each of these two cases, these two cases 
are not consolidated. At the November 27,2007, hearing on various motions in both 
cases, counsel for defendants in each of these two cases indicated on the record that he 
would be pursuing a motion to consolidate on behalf of his clients. No such motion has 
be~8~r ~~1:'awM¥il~ed~%:e~~~~e6tJ~ of these two cases, this decision will 4 
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discuss each case separately. 
At the conclusion of the November 27,2007, hearing, this Court stated that the 
ruling on the upcoming summary judgment motion (heard November 28,2007) would be 
taken under advisement and that the decision on summary judgment would not be issued 
until after this Court filed its decision on "Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12". This Court entered its "Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from 
an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12" on November 30,2007. On December 17, 2007, 
defendants in both cases filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with the Idaho Supreme 
Court. On January 25,2008, this Court received notice that on January 17, 2008, the 
Idaho Supreme Court denied defendants' Motion for Permissive Appeal in each of these 
two cases. Accordingly, summary judgment in each of these two cases is at issue. 
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiffs in both cases 
was heard November 28,2007. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company and Tower Sub Asset (collectively the 
"Plaintiffs") filed suit to declare the existence of an easement over property owned by 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, the defendants in each of the two cases. Due to a 
discovery dispute, summary judgment was limited to only the issue of express 
easement. Oral argument on the express easement theory was heard in these two 
cases at two different times. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tower 
Asset Sub against Lawrences on May 27, 2005, and this Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Capstar against Lawrences on June 7, 2005. Lawrences appealed 
this Court's finding of an express easement in both cases to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
On January 26,2007, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in both 
ca~~~~R~ Y~rhbR~~~'1BEthis%uflt 3t6~q&rn;~1~roceedings consistent with this opinion." 5 
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Capstar v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7; Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 
2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7. The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not 
have an express easement, it appeared that the case might have been concluded on 
summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' other theories. The Idaho Supreme Court 
wrote in Capstar: "It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary 
judgment proceeding to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have 
been brought to a conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to 
Capstar's other theories but not considered on summary judgment." Capstar v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7. A similar statement was made by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Tower Asset Sub, Inc.: 
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district 
court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on 
evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed 
greater promise from Tower's standpoint and it is unfortunate that those 
theories were not fully developed and decided upon. 
Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7. On May 14,2007, the 
plaintiffs in each case filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", which again 
raised for this Court's consideration the other theories of easement advanced in 
plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment, but not decided upon by this Court in 
its initial decisions on summary judgment in 2005. 
II. ANALYSIS REGARDING CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING CO. v. LAWRENCE. 
A. Facts Pertaining to Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. Lawrence. 
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and 
Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain. Both the Capstar parcel and 
the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were once part of a larger tract held under 
common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. The Lawrence parcel was broken out 
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010 6 
in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Susan Weeks 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 1f i.e., Exhibit E), and the Capstar 
parcel was broken out in 1989 when Funks sold that parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting, 
Inc. (Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5, 1f3.3, 
Exhibit Q). The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and 
the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrences' parcel in the southwest 
quarter of Section 22. Section 21 lies directly west of Section 22. Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, 1f 8, Exhibit Z. There is a 
public road in the area known as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally to 
the west of the Lawrence parcel, which in turn is west of Capstar's parcel. Capstar 
seeks an easement to access its property from Signal Point Road over an unimproved 
private road commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Blossom Mountain Road 
crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In 
litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken September 30, 
2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone Corporation (GTC) 
obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 over the private road 
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel). Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7, 1f1f 5-7, Exhibit W, 
X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the 
road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast through the southwest portion of 
Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the north half of Section 28 were it then 
turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and 
Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
Capstar and Tower Asset have proven the following chain of title for the parcels 
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010 
involved in Sections 21 and 22: 7 
1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits A 
and D. 
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks ·in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed 
August 17, 2004), Exhibits Band C. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Band C. 
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this 
case. 
Capstar and Tower Asset have established the title chain with respect to what 
became the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as: 
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992): 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2,2004), E and I; Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17,2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit A and F. 
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16, 
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H; 
. . 
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Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H. 
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July 
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17,2004), Exhibits G and 0; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and O. 
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996»: Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibits J and K. 
5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 1996, 
Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, M, 
Nand P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, Nand P. 
Capstar 'establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case 
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Q and R. 
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010 
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2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S. 
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed 
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T. 
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit u. 
Capstar asserts that prior.to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' 
parcel from the parent parcel in 1975, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had 
been used by the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 
and 22. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 9, 
2004), pp. 4-5, ~~ 7-9. Capstar asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the 
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel. 
Id., pp. 5-6, ~~ 10-12. Capstar argues the road was also later used by Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc. for access to its segregated parcel in Section 22. This claim is 
proven by the Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 9, 2004. John Rook was the President of Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. Rook's 
testimony is uncontroverted. 
The chain of title as to both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel is set 
forth in the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 9, 2004, and attached exhibits thereto. In 1975, the Funks agreed to sell the 
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. In 1992, the Funks gave Human 
s9~gfclfM"ti't~a~rrF~RWcre~~Ut ~?ct1Q8-~QJcQ; "given in fulfillment of those certain 10 
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, , 
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the 
conveyance of the above described property ... " This property passed through several 
other hands before the Lawrences purchased it in 1996. 
When the Lawrences questioned Capstar's right to access its property over the 
portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed their property, Capstar filed suit on 
November 7, 2002, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tower Asset filed a similar 
suit on June 27,2003. Capstar and Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared 
based on four theories: express easement, easement by implication, easement by 
necessity, and prescriptive easement. On plaintiffs' previous motion for summary 
judgment, this court found that plaintiffs held an express easement over the Lawrence 
property based on the sale agreement, as well as the deed. The Court did not address 
Capstar's other theories. The Lawrences appealed from that decision and the Supreme 
Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an express 
easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, the plaintiffs renew their motion for 
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously advanced by 
Capstar. 
B. Easement by Implication from Prior Use. 
An easement can be formed by implication from prior use. Creation of 
easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the rule that written instruments 
speak for themselves, and because implied easements are contrary to that rule, the 
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 Idaho 396, 400, 422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966); 
Cardwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71,77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An 
easement is implied because it is presumed that if an access was in use at the time of 
severance it was meant to continue. Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 105 Idaho 535, 
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S£ # 38300-201 Q 
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that land should not be rendered unfit for use due to a lack of access. Id. 
In order to establish an easement by implication from prior use, the party 
attempting to establish such easement must prove: 1) unity of title or ownership and 
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; 2) apparent continuous use; 
and 3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the 
dominant estate. Bear Island Water Association v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,725, 874 
P.2d 528, 536 (1994); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71,77,665 P.2d 1081,1087 
(Ct.App. 1983); Close v. Rensick, 95 Idaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis 
v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d. 403, 406-07. See also Phillips Industries, Inc. 
v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,698,827 P.2d 706,711 (Ct. App. 1992); and Davis v. 
Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999). Apparent continuous use 
refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway 
was intended to provide permanent access to the parcels. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 78, 
665 P.2d at 1088. The party seeking to establish the easement has the burden of 
providing the facts to establish the easement. Id., 105 Idaho at 77,665 P.2d at 1087. 
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 641-42, 991 P .2d 362, 366-67 (1999), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that successors in interest to the original grantors of property could 
assert easement rights by implied or prior use. 
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior 
use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 
P.2d 362 (1999); Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,132 P.3d 392 (2006). 
Reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for 
an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642. Furthermore, the 
easement by implication is not extinguished if the easement no longer exists or is no 
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010 12 
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longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643. The Idaho Supreme Court further noted in 
Davis: 
ld. 
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone 
conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is required for the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that 
is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, 
an easement implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent 
duration, rather than a temporary easement which exists only as long as 
the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 
631 (Alaska 1991); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201,593 P.2d 1138, 
1145 (1979); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla.1975). Additionally, 
an implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore 
passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient 
estates. See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958); I.C. § 
55-603 (stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements 
attached to the property). 
There can be no dispute that the first element has been proven. As to use and 
reasonable necessity, Harold Funk testified in his affidavit that when he and his wife 
Marlene purchased parts of Section 21 and 22 in 1969, there was "an existing private 
easement road used for access that crossed the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and 
entered into the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and provided access to these two 
parcels and access to the General Telephone Company parcel [GTC owned about one 
acre in Section 22]." Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment p. 2, ,-r,-r 2-3. This is the same easement road referenced in the Real Estate 
Contract between Funks and their predecessor in interest, the Radens, over which 
General Telephone Company had a recorded easement for access. Id. p. 2, ,-r 3, 
Exhibit A. This was the Funks only access into Section 21. Id. p. 3, ,-r 4. When Funks 
sold their portion of Section 21 to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor) in 
1975, Funks still owned their land in Section 22, and the sales agreement to Human 
~~ti~.n~liW~d~rn§:br#Itm§~~~~eement that " ... indicated that the Section 13 
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21 parcel was being sold subject to an ingress/egress easement over the existing road 
on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." Id. p. 3, ~ 6. Without 
those terms Funks' Section 21 property would have been landlocked, and that was not 
Harold Funk's intent. Id. Harold Funk testified that following the sale [to Human 
Synergistics], we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 to access Funks' 
property in Section 22. Id. p. 4, ~. 6. That Sales Agreement was recorded as well. Id. 
In 1989 Funks sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., 
and Funks knew Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. was going to use that parcel for 
construction of a broadcasting tower. Id. p. 4, ~ 8. Rook testified that he used this road 
several times to access the Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. Affidavit of John Rook 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, ~ 4. 
Apparent continuous use from no later than 1975 is also shown by the Affidavit 
of Wynn Wenker. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed March 9, 2004, Exhibit FF at ~1 O. The Farmanian - Mack Agreement 
and Quit Claim Deed attached also infers that there is a road across the Section 21 
property, the Farmanian property at that time. Id. Exhibit EE. Harold Funk's Affidavit 
indicates that the road subject to this action is the only road onto the property. Affidavit 
of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, ~~ 3, 4. Harold 
Funk further indicates that it was their intent to include an easement in the transfer to 
Human Synergistics so the property in Section 22 would not be landlocked. Id. ~ 6. 
Similarly, John Rook's Affidavit states that when Kootenai Broadcasing purchased from 
the Funks (at a later time in 1989), this road that is subject of this dispute was the only 
access to the property now held by Capstar. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, ~ 6. 
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Capstar noticed their Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on April 14, 
2004. Just prior to that hearing, Lawrences pro se made discovery motions related to 
information Rook and Funk had. Because such discovery was not relevant to the 
express easement theory, discovery was allowed and Capstar's motion for summary 
judgment proceeded on the express easement theory alone. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has ruled on that issue. On March 23, 2004, Lawrences pro se filed Defendants 
Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that 
pleading Lawrences claim, with a reference to a Metzker Map, that Capstar has access 
to its parcel via Mellick Road. Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to Plaitiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. On April 6, 2004, Capstar filed an Affidavit of 
Kelvin Brownsberger, the Road Supervisor for Post Falls Highway District. He testified 
in his affidavit that Post Falls Highway District has not constructed and maintained 
Mellick Road beyond its entry into Section 15, well short of Section 21 or Section 22. 
Even if Lawrences had created an issue of fact as to an alternate route (they have not), 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,642,991 P.2d 362, 367 
(1999) held only "reasonable necessity" is needed for an easement by implication, not 
strict necessity which is needed in an implied easement by necessity. 
Lawrences made one other argument in Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17. Lawrences claim Wilber Mead 
testified he kept his gate locked from1966 until 1998, that the only party that had a key 
to the gate was General Telephone Company, that Mead granted Funks an easement 
in 1972 and that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975; thus, Funks could have only 
used the property for three years instead of the requisite five. Id. Lawrences cite to the 
Affidavit of Doug las Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' Reply in 
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, but no such 
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document exists. Only the cover page of Douglas Lawrence's Affidavit is filed. 
Capstar argues that Mead only stated "to his know/edge" Mr. Funk was not using 
the road, that Mead indicates he gave a key to GTE, but Mead has no knowledge as to 
whether GTE gave a copy of the key to Funk or any knowledge that Funk did not go 
around the gate. Capstar also argues there is no evidence to support Lawrences's 
allegation that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975. Plaintiff's Reply Brief in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
In Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed May 14, 2007, Capstar reiterates the same facts, law and arguments it 
made in 2004. Lawrences, through their attorney, filed their "Opposition of Douglas and 
Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff" on July 24, 2007. In 
that brief, Lawrences essentially argue that since Funks had no right to cross Section 
28 (Section 28 lies immediately to the south of Section 22 in which Lawrences' parcel is 
contained and Blossom Mountain Road dips from Section 22, down to Section 28, 
before reaching Section 21), they have no right to croSs Blossom Mountain Road as it 
crosses Lawrences' land. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 4-5. Capstar correctly notes that in this lawsuit the 
owner of Section 28 is not a party. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Capstar's access, or lack thereof, over the portion of 
Blossom Mountain Road as it travels through Section 28 is simply not an issue before 
this Court. Finally, Lawrences again argue Capstar and their predecessor Funk had the 
ability to access their land via Mellick Road. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 6. On August 2,2007, 
Capstar filed "Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
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(Attached as Exhibit 0 to the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence filed July 24, 2007), nothing 
in the Viewer's Report and nothing in Loudin v. Stokes (a 1987 District Court decision 
by District Judge Gary M. Haman which shows it was related to Section 15 and Mellick 
Road, Exhibit C to Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary 
Judgment filed July 24,2007), demonstrate that Funks could access their Section 22 
property from Mellick Road because the Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 21. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 3. 
After Capstar filed its reply brief on summary judgment, on September 10, 2007, 
Lawrences filed yet another brief on summary judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P. 
56(c)), this one entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat, word for word the brief 
Lawrences filed on July 24, 2007, as it pertains to implied easements from prior use. 
No request for a jury trial has ever been made in Capstar v. Lawrence. 
Accordingly, "When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court 
as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 
354,360-61,93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004). 
In the Capstar case, there is unity of title at the time of the severance of the 
dominant and servient estate. The road was in use by the Funks at the time of the 
severance and served as their sole access to the Section 21 and Section 22 properties 
they retained. Thus, it was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the dominant 
estate, Funk's Section 22 property at the time of severance. Capstar has met its 
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property. 
C. Easement by Necessity. 
Capstar correctly notes that an easement by necessity has some similar 
elements to an easement by prior use. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 13. The elements are: (1) that the dominant parcel and the 
servient parcel were once part of a larger tract under common ownership; (2) that the 
necessity for the easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the 
severance; and (3) the present necessity for the claimed easement is great. Id., citing 
B&J Development & Inv. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 Idaho 504,507, 887 P.2d 49,52 (Ct.App. 
1994), MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1118, 739 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct.App. 1987); 
Bob.Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,543,681 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Ct.App 
1984). See a/so, Bearls/and Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,725,874 P.2d 
528, 536 (1994). Capstar added little in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. 
There is no dispute that the first element exists. 
As to the second and third elements, Lawrences pro se made an argument 
unsupported by the law, that because "Funks and [Capstar] don't have a legal 
easement to get to the Lawrence property to cross it", necessity does not exist. 
Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 18. This argument was noted by the Court in its analysis of an implied easement 
from prior use. Since the owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit, Lawrences' 
argument is without merit. 
Capstar claims that Kelvin Brownsberger's affidavit contradicts Lawrences' claim 
that there is access via Mellick Road based upon a Metsker's map. Plaintiff's Reply 
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Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. Because Brownsberger does 
not tell us in his affidavit when he became familiar with Mellick Road, nor does he tell us 
when he began working for the Post Falls Highway District, Brownsberger cannot 
discuss what existed back in 1969 when Funk's purchased or what existed back in 
1975 when Funks sold to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor). What is 
pertinent is what existed at severance in 1975. The Metsker's map (at the August 7, 
2007 hearing on motions to strike, this Court took judicial notice that Metsker maps 
have been relied upon for decades, but not as to their accuracy) is not sufficient to 
contradict Howard Funk's testimony. The only competent evidence of what existed in 
1975 is from Howard Funk. Funk stated: 'The private easement road was the only 
existing road providing access to the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 22" and when they severed the property in 1975 the sales 
agreement referenced that private road and that the Section 21 property being sold to 
Human Synergistics, Inc., was being sold subject to an ingress egress easement over 
the existing road, and that it was not their intent to land lock the Section 22 property. 
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3,1111 4, 6. 
John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later time in 1989 when 
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land. Rook testified in his affidavit that in 
1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funks' 
parcels in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 111f 4,6. Finally, John Mack's affidavit makes it 
clear that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks' parcels in 1992 when Mack 
purchased. Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants Lawrences Reply in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. 
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other lands when he severed the parcel sold to Hyman Synergistics in 1975, otherwise 
Funk would have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to 
Human Synergistics in 1975." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. The identical argument is made in Opposition 
of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 10-
11. This argument by Lawrences actually cuts against Lawrences quite clearly when 
one considers the uncontradicted fact that Funks in their Sale Agreement to Human 
Synergistics, Inc., stated that "the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an 
ingress egress easement over the existing road on the property that was being sold to 
Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 3, ~ 6). Just as the Lawrences argue, Funks actually did take great care 
to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975; 
however, they errantly put that language in the Sale Agreement. That is why there is no 
express easement. But the reason there is no express easement is perhaps the most 
convincing evidence as to the implied easement theories ... Funks needed to, intended 
to, and thought they did reserve an easement across the Human Synergistics land (now 
Lawrences land) when they sold to Human Synergistics in 1975. At all times thereafter 
Funks used this road as if they had every right in the world to use it. This Court finds 
that the second element of easement by necessity exists ... the necessity for the 
easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the severance in 1975. 
Capstar argues that the third element, present great necessity for the easement, 
is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Mack. Mack's affidavit does indicate Mellick 
Road does not pass over Funks' property, and Mack's affidavit indicates that even 
Mack had no access to Mellick Road until he made an agreement with Fred Zuber, who 
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the north face of Blossom Mountain." Mack also testified "Over the years, the road had 
been completely abandoned" and "It did not appear that anyone had used the road for 
nearly 20 years." Capstar also argues "As demonstrated on the assessor's map 
included as Exhibit 'A' to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence 
Affidavit filed 7/24/07, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast Quarter 
and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22", and "Funks never owned either of these 
parcels." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 13; Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence Testimony, filed 
August 4,2007, Exhibit A. 
This Court finds there is no question of fact as to whether the present necessity 
for the claimed easement is great. There is no evidence that Capstar has any other 
access other than the Blossom Mountain Road access which is the subject of this 
litigation. 
D. Easement by Prescription. 
An easement by prescription was not raised in Capstar's initial Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 9, 2004, nor did Lawrences 
discuss the theory in their pro se Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. Capstar did not raise 
the theory in its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
April 6, 2004. The first time the issue of a prescriptive easement was raised was in 
Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-
12. 
Capstar argues the road was established as early as 1966, and that it is 
undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and 
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parcel to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales 
contract language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for 
ingress and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. Id. Capstar argues this 
language provided notice to others that they were claiming a right to use the road in the 
future for ingress and egress to the lands the Funks retained, and that it is undisputed 
that Funks and their predecessors (successors) then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id. 
Capstar notes the Idaho Supreme Court in Akers v. D. L. White Construction, 
Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303,127 P.3d 196,206 (2005) held: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by 
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the 
subject property, which is characterized as: 1) open and notorious; (2) 
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) 
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient 
tenement (5) for the statutory period." (citation omitted). The statutory 
period in question is five years. (citations omitted). A claimant may rely 
on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such 
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite 
five continuous years of use." (citation omitted). Once the claimant 
presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the 
use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and 
under a claim of right. (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the 
owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was 
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. (citations 
omitted). 
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12. 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by 
permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of 
the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006). 
Lawrences argue that Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive. 
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Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. Footnote five of Lawrences' brief cites the Court to the "affidavits of 
Daniel Rebor [sic, actually Rebeor] and Douglas Lawrence" to support this claim. There 
are several Douglas Lawrence affidavits filed in this matter. The Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed July 24,2007, indicates 
just the opposite, that Capstar's use of the land at least when Lawrences came into 
possession of the land, was anything but permissive: 
25. Since taking title to the land, I have worked hard to protect my 
private property rights from illegal trespass. I have maintained one or 
more locks on my gate, placed no trespass signs at various points on the 
property, stopped and turned back people who cannot demonstrate a 
legal right to use the road, and have actively attempted to engage the 
local Sheriffs office on many occasions to get their support. Between 
May 2000, and October 2003, I have filed over 10 separate crime reports 
with the Kootenai County Sheriffs office for vandalism, trespass, 
destruction of personal property, and for leaving my gate open and 
unlocked. These Crime Reports are attached and included herein as 
Exhibit "I". 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment. filed 
July 24, 2007, p. 9 (unnumbered pages), 1125. Douglas Lawrence's affidavit 
contradicts the claim his attorney makes on his behalf. Lawrences' claim that use of 
the land has always been permissive flies in the face of the fact that the genesis of this 
lawsuit was Lawrences "periodically locked the gate which they placed across the 
Blossom Mountain Road in an effort to deny Capstar its right of access over and across 
the Blossom Mountain Road." Complaint for Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction, p. 6, 
,-r xvrv (XIX). 
Douglas Lawrence's affidavit claims that prior to 2001, "Capstar's use of the road 
as it crosses my land was permissive." Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007, p. 14 (unnumbered pages), 11 
49, Exhibit M. Douglas Lawrence cites to Capstar's response to Lawrences' Request 
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Lawrence did not use any gate to restrict Plaintiff Capstar's Vehicular access", to which 
Capstar responded: "Admit that the gate has always been on the road since Capstar's 
predecessors in title acquired the Capstar parcel was not locked and did not obstruct 
either Capstar or its predecessors in title's access until it was locked by Lawrence." Id. 
The fact that the gate is not locked may be evidence of Lawrences' acquiescence of 
others, including Capstar, to travel this road, it may be evidence of Lawrences' 
indifference of others, including Capstar, travelling this road, and it may be evidence of 
Lawrences' ignorance of anyone, including Capstar travelling this road, but it is not 
evidence that Lawrences or their predecessors gave Capstar or its predecessors 
permission to use this road. "Mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient 
basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of 
the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d 1326,1333 (1973). 
Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive" 
ignores the fact that Lawrences did not purchase their property until 1996. Thus, in the 
years from 1966 to 1996, they are not competent to testify as to anything that occurred 
in that period. 
Lawrences cite the affidavit of Daniel Rebar [Rebeor] for their claim that 
Capstar's use of the road was permissive. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. There is an Affidavit 
of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed July 22, 
2003. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he managed the tower site for Capstar, and 
that "On November 3,1997, Nextel West Corp. entered into an "Access License 
Agreement" with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an effort to avoid litigation regarding 
access to a leased parcel upon which it was locating a communications tower. .. " 
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Access License Agreement to Capstar. Id. 11 4. The uncontroverted evidence is the 
license was entered into in 1997 "in an effort to avoid litigation". That certainly is not 
evidence that there was permissive use of the road at that time. It is evidence of just 
the opposite, that Lawrences were claiming Capstar had no right to use the road. 
Certainly the assignment of a license would stop the adverse period from running per 
the quoted portion of Akers, but the evidence has not been contradicted by Lawrences 
that from 1966 to 2003 Capstar and their predecessors used this road under a claim of 
right. 
Capstar's uncontradicted evidence is as follows: Harold Funk testified in his 
affidavit that: "Following the sale [in 1975), we continuously utilized the existing road in 
Section 21 to access our property in SeCtion 22 without interference." Affidavit of 
Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 2004, p. 4, 11 
6. John Rook testified in his affidavit that when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased 
its parcel in 1989: 
There were other nearby parcels used for towers further east from 
the parcel purchased by Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., including a parcel of 
property owned and used by General Telephone Company. At the time 
that Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcels, these property 
owners and their tenants were using the road to access their parcels, and 
continued to do so after Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcel. 
Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 
2004, p. 2, 113. 
The existing private access road was visible and in use by Funks at 
the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel. I have personally 
driven this road and used it on several occasions to access the Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. The private road was the only road that 
provided access to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. 's parcel of property. 
Id. p. 3, 114. 
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Funks) ability to obtain a prescriptive easement. First, Lawrences claim "In 1975, Funk 
moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, Idaho, where he has resided since. 
(Funk Deposition, hereinafter 'FD' 28:20 to 28:24.). Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Lawrences then argue: 
"After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom Mountain only two or 
three times (FD 30:25 to 31:4)" and "Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land 
since 1981 (FD 31:17)." Id., p. 5. What Lawrences omit from that same deposition is 
the following: 
Q. BY MR. WHELAN: Now between the time you bought the property 
and the time you sold it to Human Synergistics, how many times did you 
go up to the property? 
A. Well, we'd always go up andpick huckleberries and stuff, and target 
practice and - I don't know. I would have to guess maybe, I don't know, 
20,30 times. 
Q. In the two year period, well three years since 1969. I'm sorry. Six-
year period, from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on top of the 
mountain? 
A. I would suppose, yeah. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibit A (August 17, 2007 Deposition of Harold Funk), p. 25, L1. 11-23. 
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of the 
Lawrence property in getting to his property from 1975 to the present is not relevant. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk used the property consistently for the six-
year period from the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the 
area. This is one year more than the five years required for the prescriptive use. 
This isn't the type of property of which one would expect daily use. The property is on 
top of a mountain. Capstar seeks this easement to maintain its radio equipment on top 
of this mountain. The use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks 
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It is the long established rule in this jurisdiction [Idaho] that any right gained 
by prescription is confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive 
period. "It is limited by the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to 
which it is put." 
Idaho Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512,515, 
733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 
566, 568, 602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979). U[P]resciption acts as a penalty against a landowner 
and thus the rights obtained by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by 
the courts. Id., citing Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977). The 
character and extent of a prescriptive easement generally is fixed and determined by the 
use under which it was acquired. No different or materially greater use can be made of 
such an easement, except by further adverse use for the prescriptive period. 25 
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 81. 
The uncontroverted evidence is the road was established as early as 1966, and 
it is undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and 
Section 22 parcels. It is uncontradicted that when Funks sold the Section 21 parcel to 
Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales contract 
language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for ingress 
and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. It is uncontradicted that Funks in 
fact made use of that road. This language in the recorded sales contract provided· 
notice to others that Funks were claiming a right to use the road in the future for ingress 
and egress to the lands the Funks retained. The uncontroverted evidence is that Funks 
and their successors relied on that language in the recorded sales contract as it is 
undisputed that Funks and their successors then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for much longer than the 
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E. Lawrences' New Defenses of Laches and Statute of Limitations. 
On September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Answer, requesting to add the additional defense of laches. This motion to amend was 
granted and an order to that effect was filed on September 26, 2007. Also on 
September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed another brief on summary judgment, this one 
entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment 
of Plaintiff". In that brief, Lawrences repeat their arguments made in their brief filed July 
24,2007, regarding implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity and 
easement by prescription. Lawrences claim additional facts not in dispute. Finally, 
Lawrences also added a brief argument on Statute of Limitations and a one paragraph 
argument regarding laches. Lawrences also filed on September 10, 2007, an "Affidavit 
of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Leave to Amend." On September 17, 2007, Capstar filed "Plaintiff's 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment". 
1) Statute of Limitations. 
Lawrences argue Idaho Code § 5-203 and 5-204 apply to bar Capstar's claims. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, p. 6. Lawrences provide no legal analysis to support that argument. Idaho 
Code § 5-203 is not a statue of limitation. It simply sets forth the number of years a 
plaintiff in an action must be in possession of the property in question before filing a 
lawsuit to adverse possess that property. Idaho Code § 5-204 is also not a statute of 
limitation, but, simply a statute setting forth the number of years a party must be seized 
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not just the plaintiff as in I.C. § 5-203, and it applies to defenses and to prescriptive 
easements, where I.C. § 5-203 only concerns prescriptive possession of property. 
Lawrences argue: "Plaintiff's complaint makes no reference to its predecessors 
interest". Id. First, Lawrences completely fail to explain the legal significance of that 
claim. There can be no legal basis for this argument, as both I.C. § 5-203 and § 5-204 
specifically mention a party's predecessor. Idaho case law has long since recognized 
this fact that a party's predecessor's use of property or time in possession can be 
tacked on to the party's use or time in possession to achieve the requisite number of 
years. Akers v. D. L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 
(2005); Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 975 (2003); State ex reI. 
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 146,594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979); Marshall v. Blair, 130 
Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Second, from a factual standpoint, 
Lawrences' claim is false. Capstar's Complaint, p. 6, 1r XVII alleges: "Capstar and its 
predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the 
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously, 
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years." 
Lawrences next argue: "Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to 
be perfected." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. Again, there is no explanation as to the legal basis of this 
claim. Such argument is squarely contradicted by Idaho Code § 5-203, § 5-204, and 
the analysis of Hodgins, Haman, Marshall and Akers. 
2) Laches. 
Lawrences entire argument on laches is as follows: 
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of 
fact. Osterlich v.State of Idaho, 100 Idaho 702,604 P.2d 716. It is 
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beyond question that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged 
stale claims which Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. If Plaintiff and its 
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity and/or by 
prescriptive use, those claims should have been perfected through 
litigation. The failure to pursue the claims by Plaintiff's predecessors has 
clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and their predecessors to 
defend against the claims. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, p. 7. (italics in original). While Lawrences claim it is "beyond question" that 
Lawrences have been prejudiced, there is not one fact alleged, not one bit of argument 
stating why this is so. Similarly, there is no factual or legal argument made why 
Capstar's claims or Capstar's predecessor's "claims should have been perfected 
through litigation." The obvious flaw to Lawrences' unsupported argument is prior to 
Lawrences purchasing their property and subsequently denying Capstar access, there 
was no need to litigate! Every indication is that as soon as Lawrences prohibited 
Capstar's access, Capstar took action. Capstar simply is not "guilty of laches." 
There is absolutely no merit to either of Lawrences' defenses of statute of 
limitations or laches. 
II. ANALYSIS REGARDING TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. v. LAWRENCE. 
A. Facts Pertaining to Tower Asset Sub, Inc., v. Lawrence. 
As a preliminary matter, on November 13, 2007, Tower Asset filed a "Motion for 
Substitution of Real Party in Interest." The basis for this motion is Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. became Tower Asset Sub, L.L.C., and on February 23, 2007, Tower Asset Sub, 
L.L.C. merged into Spectra Site, L.L.C., a different Deleware Corporation. Affidavit of 
Raymond W. Goodwin in Support of Substitution of Real Party in Interest. This motion 
was heard on November 28, 2007, just prior to oral argument on Capstar's summary 
judgment motion. At the end of oral argument on the Motion for Substitution of Real 
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prepare an order. No order has been prepared to date. Since no order has been 
entered until this decision and order, the Court will continue to refer to the plaintiff in this 
action as Tower Asset Sub, Inc., (Tower Asset) even though the Court has granted the 
motion to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest. 
Tower Asset has made it clear that it is only seeking injunctive relief in this case, 
and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrences' land. Plaintiff's 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. 
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and the 
Halls (through whom Tower Asset claims its right) own parcels of property on Blossom 
Mountain. Both the Halls' parcel and the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were 
once part of a larger tract held under common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. 
The Lawrence parcel was broken out in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human 
Synergistics. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset Case filed August 17, 2004), p. 2, ,-r 2.e., Exhibit E. The Halls' parcel was 
broken out in 1996 when Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. Id., Exhibit Q. The 
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Halls' parcel 
is located to the east in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Id. Section 21 lies directly 
west of Section 22. Id., p. 6, ~ 8, Exhibit Z. There is a public road in the area known 
as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally West of the Lawrence parcel, 
which in turn is west of Hail's parcel. Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an 
easement to access its equipment located on Halls' property which Tower Asset leases 
from the Halls. The easement is located on an unimproved private road commonly 
known as Blossom Mountain Road as Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the 
Lawrence parcel. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition 
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Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' 
parcel). Id., pp. 6-7, ~~ 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road 
prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then 
travels southeast through the southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then 
enters the North Half of Section 28 where it then turned northeast and entered the 
southeast quarter of Section 21. Jd. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
Tower Asset asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' parcel 
from the parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by 
the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 and 22. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (field August 17, 2004), pp. 
4-5, ~~ 7-9. Tower Asset asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the 
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel. 
Id., pp. 5-6, ~~ 10-11. 
Capstar and Tower Asset prove the following chain of title for the parcels 
involved in Sections 21 and 22: 
1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. 
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed 
August 17,2004), Exhibits Band C. 
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this 
case. 
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the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as: 
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992): 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2,2004), E and I; Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit A and F. 
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16, 
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H. 
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July 
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17,2004), Exhibits G and 0; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and O. 
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17,2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibits J and K. 
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5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 
1996, Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, 
M, Nand P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, Nand P. 
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case 
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibit Exhibits Q and R. 
2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Jud gment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S. 
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed 
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T. 
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25,2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit u. 
Tower Asset establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Hall property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 
17,2004), Exhibit Q. 
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2. Rasmussen to VanSky (Deed September 29, 1978): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case 
filed August 17,2004), Exhibit R 
3. VanSky to Switzer Communications, Inc. (Deed December 11,'1981): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit S. 
4. Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp. (Deed December 8, 1982): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit T. 
5. Term Corp. to Mark E. Hall and Robert A. Hall (Deed April 16, 1997); 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit U. 
6. Spectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest with Mark Hall and Robert 
Hall in a Parcel of property situated in the Southwest quarter of Section 
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Mer4idian, Kootenai 
County, Idaho. Affidavit of Dan Rebear (Tower Asset case filed July 22, 
2003). 
When the Lawrences questioned Tower Asset's right to access the property it 
leases from the Halls over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed 
Lawrences', Tower Asset filed suit on June 27, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared based on four theories: 
express easement, easement by implication, easement by necessity, and prescriptive 
easement. On Tower Asset's previous motion for summary judgment, this court found 
that Tower Asset held an express easement over the Lawrence property based on the 
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and Entering Decree of Quiet Title, filed May 27, 2005. The Court did not address 
Tower Assefs other theories raised in its Complaint due to a discovery issue at the 
time. Accordingly, Tower Asset and Lawrences in that initial motion for summary 
judgment did not address theories of easement by implication, easement by necessity 
and prescriptive easement. The Lawrences appealed from that decision, and the 
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an 
express easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, Tower Asset renews its 
motion for summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously 
raised in their complaint. 
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land 
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided 
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc., while 
retaining the southwest quarter of Section 22. Tower Asset asserts that although its 
origins are unknown, it is apparent that an easement over the road existed as early as 
1966. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken 
September 30, 2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone 
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' 
parcel). Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-
7, ~If[ 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's 
engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast 
through the Southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the North 
Half of Section 28 were it then turned northeast and entered the Southeast quarter of 
Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
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parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by the 
Funks as an exclusive means to access their property. That same road was later used 
by Hall for access to their segregated parcel in Section 22. Affidavit of Robert Hall in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, ,-r,-r 7, 8. In 1992, the Funks executed 
and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics. 
The warranty deed stated that the deed was given "in fulfillment of those certain 
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the 
conveyance of the above described property." In 1996, after a number of other 
intermediate conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel. 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already 
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right to 
use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: 'Tower 
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the 
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. 
Lawrences also claim Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant and 
that Tower Asset has no standing to seek to quiet title across Lawrences' land. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, pp. 1,2, 9, 10. A copy of the lease between Nextel Communications and Hall 
is included with the Affidavit of Robert Hall. Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2, ,-r,-r 3, 4, Exhibit A Hall received notice that this lease was 
assigned to Tower Parent Corp., and Tower Asset Sub, Inc., and that Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Id. p. 2, ,-r,-r 4, 5. Additionally, the Supreme 
Court in Tower Asset, Inc., v. Lawrence, supra, noted that: "We hold that Tower, as 
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the Lawrence's from interfering with its right to sue the easement." Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. The Idaho Supreme Court also held: 
"Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged 
legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement." Id. Lawrences' 
argument that Tower Asset lacks standing to pursue easement theories of implication 
or necessity (Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 6-7) is without merit. Lawrences admit Tower Asset 
has standing to prove an easement by prescription. Id., p. 7. 
Lawrences next argue that Hall has no easement by necessity or implication and 
thus has nothing to assign to Tower Asset, and that the only theory available to Tower 
Asset is easement by prescription. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1-3, 8. Tower Asset now argues that 
nothing presented by the Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset 
has standing as a lessee of the dominant estate. Tower Asset correctly argues "the 
only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower 
Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road 
easement of its landlord, Halls." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2. (emphasis added). This is because the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted in Footnote 1 that: "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall 
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrence 
parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. 
In accordance with 28A C.J.S. Easements § 164 (1996), Tower Asset argues 
that while a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the 
owner of the way, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as well as by persons 
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transacting business with him, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary. 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. 
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there is nothing contained in the copy of the 
lease between Tower Asset and Hall that demonstrates a special agreement between 
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may not use an easement for which the Halls 
have the benefit. Id. at p. 3. Hence, Tower Asset argues they are entitled to injunctive 
relief. Id. 
Lawrences argue that Tower Asset is not the Halls' tenant since the Halls and 
Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 10. The lease between Nextel and the Halls has a provision that reads: 
"Lessee may not assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest in this 
Agreement or in the Premises without the prior written consent of Lessors ... " Affidavit 
of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ~ 14. Tower 
Asset re-characterizes Lawrences argument as follows: "Essentially, Lawrences argue 
that Hall may not waive a contract clause." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Tower Asset correctly 
states that as long as the Halls and Tower Asset are in agreement that they share a 
tenant/landlord relationship pursuant to the lease, Lawrences may not challenge that 
relationship. Id. The uncontroverted evidence by Robert Hall is " ... that Tower Asset 
Sub, Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, ~1I 4, 5, Exhibit A. This Court finds the 
uncontroverted evidence shows that Hall and Tower Asset are in agreement that they 
share a landlord and tenant relationship. As noted by Tower Asset, "No law requires 
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of the term." Plaintiff's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 3. Obviously, Hall and Nextel either agreed to waive the 
assignment term, or they simply are not concerned with that provision. There is no 
assignment issue at issue here. Quite simply, the Lawrences are not in privity to the 
leasing agreement between Nextel and the Hails, or the agreement between Nextel's 
assignee, Tower Asset, and the Halls. Therefore, Tower Asset is correct in asserting its 
right to use the Halls' easement over Lawrences' land. Tower Asset is entitled to 
injunctive relief. 
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Tower presented uncontroverted 
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road 
across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 
14, p. 4. Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication from 
prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls. 
The only additional argument made by Lawrences as to an easement by prescription is 
that Lawrences argue that Tower Asset itself makes no claim that it has used the 
Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously, and in a hostile manner for the 
statutory period. Lawrences' argument continues that since no prescriptive claim has 
been established by Tower Asset and since Tower Asset's use of the road has always 
been permissive, a prescriptive easement cannot exist. The Court's analysis above 
explains why these arguments have no merit. The only additional argument made by 
Lawrences as to an implied easement by prior use is Lawrences assert that the parcel 
at issue in the Tower Asset case was not created or severed from the Funks' other 
lands until 1977 (as opposed to 1975 in the Capstar case) when Funk conveyed the 
property to Rasmussen/Chamberlain. Lawrences argue that because there was no 
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therefore no prior use, Tower Asset has failed to meet the second element of an 
implied easement. This Court has already explained why there was an easement by 
implication, from prior use and by prescription in 1975. 
As lessee from Halls, Tower Asset is entitled to injunctive relief against 
Lawrences as to use of this easement across Lawrences' land for use of this road 
known as Signal Point Road. 
Just as in the Capstar case, Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the 
arguments of statute of limitations and laches. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 8-9. The analysis 
above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case. Lawrences cannot avail 
themselves of those defenses for the reasons stated above. 
III. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
by Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 20027671 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judmgnet 
filed in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 20034621, are GRANTED. In the 
Capstar case, Capstar has proven they have an implied easement by prior use, an 
easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to 
establish a material fact as to any other these theories. In the Capstar case, 
Lawrences have failed to establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. 
The defenses of laches and statute of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in 
the Capstar case. 
In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to injunctive 
relief, as their landlord, the Hails, have an easement over Lawrences land established 
by prior use, by necessity and by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to establish a 
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material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. The defenses of laches and statute 
of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in the Tower Asset case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in the Tower Asset case, that Tower Asset's motion 
to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest is GRANTED. 
Entered this 6th day of February, 2008. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPST AR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation 
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BRENDA J. LA WRENCE, Husband 
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CASE NO. CV-02-07671 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say: 
1. I make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. I am over the age of 18. I 
am knowledgeable of the facts and issues regarding this matter and am competent to 
testify to the facts contained in this affidavit. 
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Opinion No. 86, (Amended Opinion) Docket No. 35120, in the matter of Caps tar v. 
Lawrence. 
DATED this 8th day of September 20 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day of September, 2010 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Docket No. 35120 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------~) 
Coeur d'Alene, April 2010 Term 
2010 Opinion No. 86 
Filed: August 25, 2010 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
AMENDED OPINION, THE 
COURT'S PRIOR OPINION 
DATED JULY 26, 2010 IS 
HEREBY WITIIDRA WN 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
The appeal is dismissed. 
Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda 1. Lawrence, Coeur d' Alene, pro se appellants. 
Douglas Lawrence argued. 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Susan Weeks 
argued. 
HORTON, Justice 
This case involves the question whether Capstar Radio Operating Company (Capstar) 
holds an easement over the land of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (the Lawrences) to access a 
radio transmitter located in Kootenai County. It is related to Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 
No. 35119-2008, also before this Court. 
The Lawrences appeal from the district court's memorandum decision and order granting 
Capstar's motion for summary judgment. Because we do not have jurisdiction to decide this 
case, we dismiss this appeal. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Lawrences and Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain, south of Post 
Falls, Idaho. In 2002, Capstar filed this action seeking recognition of an easement over the 
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property owned by the Lawrences to maintain and repair a radio transmitter located on Capstar's 
property. Tower Asset Sub Inc. (Tower) filed a similar action in 2003. Capstar moved for 
summary judgment on express, implied, and prescriptive easement theories. After the 
Lawrences complained that Capstar was being unresponsive to their discovery requests, the 
district court ruled solely on the express easement theories. It found that an express easement 
existed based upon an earlier contract between two other parties. The Lawrences appealed and 
this Court reversed, finding that no express easement over the Lawrence property was retained 
by Capstar's predecessor in interest. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 
708,152 P.3d 575, 579 (2007). 
On remand, Capstar renewed its motion for summary judgment on the remaining theories 
of an easement by implication from prior use, an easement by necessity, and a prescriptive 
easement. The Lawrences subsequently filed a motion for disqualification of the district judge. 
The district judge heard evidence and issued a written decision declining to disqualify himself. 
On February 6, 2008, the district court issued a combined decision in both the Capstar and the 
related Tower cases captioned as a "Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiff s Motion to Substitute Real Party 
in Interest" (the Memorandum Decision). The district court found that an easement by 
implication from prior use or, in the alternative, an easement by necessity or a prescriptive 
easement had arisen over the Lawrence property. The district court rejected the Lawrences' 
defenses. There is no judgment in the record. The Lawrences now appeal. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time on its own 
initiative. T.J.T., Inc. v. Mori, 148 Idaho 825, 826, 230 P.3d 435, 436 (2010) (citing In re 
Quesnell Dairy, 143 Idaho 691, 693, 152 P.3d 562, 564 (2007». Indeed, "this Court is always 
obligated to ensure its own jurisdiction." State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 353, _,233 P.3d 1275, 1278 
n. 3 (2010) (citing Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 960, 188 P.3d 900, 902 
(2008». "Jurisdictional issues are questions oflaw over which this Court exercises free review." 
T.J.T., Inc., 148 Idaho at 826, 230 P.3d at 436 (citing Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151, 
219 P.3d 473, 475 (2009»). 
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The Memorandum Decision concluded with a section entitled "Order" that states, in 
pertinent part, as follows: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judmgnet [sic] filed in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are 
GRANTED." (capitalization, bold original). 
In Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002), this Court attempted 
to define the court documents that would constitute final judgments for purposes of I.A.R. 
11 (a)(1). I We stated: 
Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be 
determined by its content and substance, and not by its title. Idah Best, Inc. v. 
First Security Bank of Idaho, NA., 99 Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978). As a 
general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, 
adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a fmal 
determination of the rights of the parties. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 
P.2d 362 (l999). It must be a separate document, Hunting v. Clark County School 
Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 931 P.2d 628 (1997); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 58(a), that 
on its face states the relief granted or denied. 
137 Idaho at 867, 55 P.3d at 321. 
Later, in In re Universe Life Insurance Co., this Court reiterated earlier statements that 
"[a]n order granting summary judgment does not constitute a judgment." 144 Idaho 751, 756, 
1 In recent months, this Court has repeatedly addressed the question of what constitutes an appealable order or 
judgment, most notably in Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010), 
Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 226 P.3d 530 (2010) and T.J.T., Inc. v. Mori, 
148 Idaho 825,230 P.3d 435 (2010). In an effort to reduce confusion, this Court has adopted significant changes to 
the governing rules of civil and appellate procedure. Effective July 1,2010, I.A.R. II now provides: 
An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following 
judgments and orders: 
(a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders ofa district court in a civil action: 
(1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including 
judgments of the district court granting or denying peremptory writs of mandate and prohibition. 
LR.C.P. 54(a) now defines 'judgment" and "final judgment" as follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled Judgment or Decree. A 
judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the 
action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report ofa master, the record of prior proceedings, courts legal reasoning, 
findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final 
pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief. 
except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. 
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171 P.3d 242, 247 (2007) (citing Camp; Hunting v. Clark Co. School Dist. No. 161, 1291daho 
634,931 P.2d 628 (1997». More recently, in Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable lnv., LLC, 
148 Idaho 616, 619, 226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010), this Court explained that "[t]he judgment 
sought is a final determination of a claim or claims for relief in the lawsuit." The Court 
continued: 
Id. 
The relief to which a party is entitled is not the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment. [Rule 54(c), I.R.C.P.] refers to the relief to which the party is 
ultimately entitled in the lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the lawsuit. The 
granting of a motion for summary judgment is simply a procedural step towards 
the party obtaining that relief. 
Thus, when faced with the situation where the trial court had entered an order granting 
summary judgment, but no separate judgment was entered, this Court had no alternative but to 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. T.JT., Inc., 148 Idaho at 826,230 P.3d at 436. For 
the same reason, this appeal must be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to decide this appeal as no final and appealable 
judgment was entered below. The appeal is therefore dismissed. 
ChiefJustice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR. 
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Douglas P. Lawrence, Pro Se 
Brenda J. Lawrence, Pro Se 
Post Office Box 1027 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1027 
Telephone: (208)-704-0644 
STATE or IDAHO 1 SS 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAII . 
FILED: 
20lU SEP -8 PM I: 24 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and 
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, Husband 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-02-07671 
DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES' 
MOTION REQUESTING THE 
COURT ENTER A FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Douglas P. Lawrence, en Pro Se, and Brenda 1. Lawrence, en Pro 
Se and respectfully moves the Court pursuant to rule 54( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure for an entry of fmal jUdgment. This motion is supported by the Affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence in Support of Motion for Entry of Final Judgment together with the 
matters on file herein. 
On February 6,2008, this court published a Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. At the time, the defendants 
DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES' MOTION 
REQUESTING THE COURT ENTER A FINAL JUDGMENT - 1 
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Lawrences were represented by John P. Whelan P.C., a licensed attorney in the State of 
Idaho. 
On March 19,2008, John P. Whelan, filed a Notice of Appeal to take this issue up 
with the Idaho Supreme Court. 
On Sept. 9,2008, the Idaho Supreme Court filed an order granting the withdrawal 
of John P. Whelan as the Lawrences'legal consul. The Lawrences took the appeal up as 
Pro Se Appellants. 
On July 26, 20 I 0, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal citing a lack of 
jurisdiction because there is no judgment in the record. The Idaho Supreme Court later 
withdrew this opinion and on August 25,2010, issued an amended opinion. See Exhibit 
A attached to the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Motion for Entry of Final 
Judgment. 
The Supreme Court concluded that: 
Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be 
determined by its content and substance, and not by its title. Idah Best, Inc. v. 
First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 99 Idaho 517,584 P.2d 1242 (1978). As a 
general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, 
adjudicates the subject matter ofthe controversy, and represents a final 
determination ofthe rights of the parties. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 
P.2d 362 (1999). It must be a separate document, Hunting v. Clark County 
School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 931 P.2d 628 (1997); IDAHO R. eIV. P. 
58(a), that on its face states the relief granted or denied. 137 Idaho at 867, 55 
P.3d at 321. 
DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES' MOTION 
REQUESTING THE COURT ENTER A FINAL JUDGMENT - 2 
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DATED this 8ID day of SEPTEMBER, 2010. 
----------,/ 
Brenda J. Lawrence 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed via USPS and addressed 
to: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks. P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
On this 8th day of SEPTEMBER, 2010 
DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES' MOTION 
REQUESTING THE COURT ENTER A FINAL JUDGMENT - 3 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTARRADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DECLARING EASEMENT 
RIGHTS 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
on November 27,2007. The Court having heard the argument of counsel, being fully advised in 
the premises, and having issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff s 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff s Motion is Granted and the cOUli hereby declares that Plaintiff has an 
ingress and egress easement by prescription; an easement implied by prior use and an easement 
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 21, Township 51 NOlih, 
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
EASEMENT RIGHTS: 1 
Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
2. That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiffs tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site. 
DATED this ~ day of Se.rkL;r ~05. 
CERTIFICATE O~ICE 
I hereby certify that on the k day of ~ , 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and COlTect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas P. and Brenda 1. Lawrence 
P.O. Box 1027 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
o U.S. Mail 
Susan P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: (208) 664-1684 
o Telecopy (FAX) 
Telecopy (FAX) 
D.fl. ~n'i ~y M!·...: .. ~· ... -...u 
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
EASEMENT RIGHTS: 2 
BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
That ponion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, Township SO Notrh, Range 5 
West., BOlse Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows' 
Commencing at the Sou.theast comer of Section 21, monumented by a 2 Yz" Zmc 
cap, thence westerly along the sou.th line of said secuon, Sou.th 89°27'43" West, 602.57 
feet to the centt!rline of Apple Blossom Mountain RO::ld J'!..l1d the POJNT OF 
BEGINNING. 
thence continuing along said sectlon line South 89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the 
Nonh righr-of-way of Apple Blossom road, 
thence leaving said section line and cominl.l.mg along the said North right-ot-way 
the following courses and distances; 
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to the right, having a radIu.s of750.23 feet, and a 
long chord thaI bears North 12°42'32" East, 254.07 feet; 
thence North 18°35'46" 'East, 164.80 feet; 
thence North 26°21 '12" East, 43.85 feet; 
thence 157.70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radIUS 0[90.06 feet, and a 
long chora that bears North 79°21 '30" East, 138.32 feet; 
thence South 50°55'04" East, 163.40 feet; 
thence South 58°42'22" East, 163,84 feet; 
thence South 61 °12'45" East, 5465 feet; 
thence South 64 °56 '20" East, 41.65 feef to the East line of SectlOn 21 ; 
thence leaving said right-ai-way along said Section hne South 00°19'03" East, 
33 2U feet to the:: South nght"of-way of Apple Blossom Road; 
thence continuing along said right-of-way the following courses and distance~ 
thence North 64°56'20" West, 56.86 feet; 
thence North 61 °12'45" West, 56.28 feet; 
thence North 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
thence:: Nonh 50°55'03" West, 165.66 feet; 
thence 104.52 feet along a curve to the left having a radius of 60.06 feel and a 
long chord which bears South 79"'41 '04" West, 91.82 feet; 
thence Somh 26°21 '12" West, 40 99 fecI, 
thence South 18°35'46" West, 163.79 feet; 
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thence 244.25 feeT along a curve to the left, having a radills of 720.23 feet, and a 
long chord that bears South 12°49' 18" West, 243.09 feet to the South hne of Secrion 
21 ; 
thence leavin,t?; said right-of-way Westerly along said Section line South 
89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 0.704 acres, more or less. 
END OF DESCRIPTION 
Prepared by: 
J-U-B ENGINEERS, Inc. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P.L.S. 
RMHll3I.t: 
r 'J'nlJ.:cl.120..().l-O&7 Wcck.Hilussum Mlll/tlln"'<lIIl_I'IJ .. c~scm"nl.Q(lC 
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FllED~ ~ G 1 q Douglas P. Lawrence, Pro Se 
Brenda J. Lawrence, Pro Se 
Post Office Box 1027 ZD!OI'WV 10 PH I: 14 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816-1027 
Cellphone: (208)-704-0644 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPST AR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and 
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, husband 
and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
CASE NO. CV-02-07671 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: The above-named Plaintiff, CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
and its attorney, Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the above-entitled action by 
The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 1 (a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the February 6, 
2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary judgment, together with the 
trial court order denying Defendants' renewed motion for disqualification for cause. 
4. The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(a) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify 
itself for cause? 
(b) In granting the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, are the 
trial court findings supported by substantial and competent 
evidence? 
(c) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff 
prejudgment access to Defendants' land without first requiring a 
bond or undertaking? 
( d) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only 
two weeks to complete their discovery? 
(e) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiffs' 
affidavits in their entirety over Defendant's objections? 
(f) Did the trail court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant's 
affidavits? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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5. (a) A reporter's transcript has already been prepared in this matter and were 
forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court as Docket Number 35120-2008. 
(b) The Defendants request that judicial notice be taken of the following 
transcripts: 
- June 13, 2007 Hearing re: Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Motion for Enlargement of Time; 
Application for Order Shortening time; Motion 
for Disqualification for Cause; Motion to Strike 
Portions of Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence; 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of John Mack 
- August 6, 2007 Hearing re: Motion for Reconsideration; Motion 
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory 
Order 
- August 7, 2007 Hearing re: Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Motion for Enlargement of Time; Motion to 
Strike; Request for Judicial Notice; Motion to 
Strike all Whelan's Motions 
- October 31,2007 Hearing re: Motion to Shorten Time and 
Application for Sixth Access 
- November 27, 2007 Hearing re: Renewed Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause; Motion to Substitute 
Real Party in Interest; Renewed Motion to 
Appeal and Interlocutory Order; Motion to 
Continue Trial 
6. A clerk's record has already been prepared in this matter to include the 
documents specified in subsection (b)(1) of Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and 
were forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court as Docket Number 35120-2008. The 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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defendants request that judicial notice be taken of said clerk's record to include the 
following documents: 
(a) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for summary 
judgment together with all affidavits submitted in support of the motion. 
(b) Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary judgment 
and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition to Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. 
(c) Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for cause and all supporting briefs and 
affidavits. 
(d) Defendants' original motion to disqualify for cause and all supporting briefs and 
affidavits. 
(e) Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and affidavits in 
support. 
(t) The original Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' 
Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 
2004 in Case CV-02-7671. 
7. The Defendants request that the Clerk's record be augmented to include the 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaring Easement 
Rights and this Notice of Appeal. Defendants further request that the Idaho Supreme 
Court take judicial notice of all exhibits that have been offered in the course of the 
various motions before the District Court that are, in whole or part, the subject of the 
instant appeal. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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8. I hereby certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of the 
District Court. 
(b) Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Ru1e 20 of the Idaho Appellate Ru1es. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 2010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of November, 2010 I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks. P .A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
via: U.S. Mail, Postage prepaid 
Julie Foland 
Court Reporter 
324 West Garden Ave. 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
via: U.S. Mail, Postage prepaid 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
~~.e..-D 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DECLARING EASEMENT 
RIGHTS 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
on November 27, 2007. The Courl having heard the argument of counsel, being fully advised in 
the premises, and having issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff s Motion is Granted and the cOllrt hereby declares that Plaintiff has an 
ingress and egress easement by prescription; an easement implied by prior use and an easement 
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 2 J, Township 51 North, 
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
... A C'r:'hA"L'"l>.lT Dlf:.U'T'C', 1 
Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
2. That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site. 
DA TED this ~ day of 
''-... 
CERTIFI CA TE OF S'ERVI CE 
I hereby certify that on the k day of ~ , 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy ofthe foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas P. and Brenda J. Lawrence 
P.O. Box 1027 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
o U.S. Mail 
o T elecopy (FAX) 
Telecopy (FAX) 
BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
ThaT portion of the Southeast 114 of Section 21, Township 50 Norrh, Range 5 
West, BOIse Meridian, Kootenai County. idaho, more panicularly described as follows' 
Commencing at th~ Southeast comer of Section 21, rnonumemed by a 2 l4" Zmc 
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said sectwn, SouTh 89°27'43" West, 602.57 
feet to the centc:rline of Apple Blossom Mountain ROl'ld l'l.nd the POfNT OF· 
BBGINNING. 
thence continuing along said sectlon line South 89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the 
North right-of-way of Apple Blossom road, 
thence leaving said secrion line and cominumg along the said North rigln·of~way 
the foI1owing courses and distances; 
mence 255.30 feeT along a curve to the right, having a radIus 0[750.23 feel, and a 
long chord thaI bears North 12"'42'32" East, 254.07 feet; 
lhence North 18°35'46" East, 164.80 feet; 
mt"!nce North 26°21 '12" East, 43.85 feet; 
thence 157.70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radlUs of 90.06 feet, and a 
long chora that bears North 79°21'30" East, 138.32 feet; 
thence South 50°55'04" fast, 163.40 feet; 
thence South 58°42'22" East, 163.84 feet; 
rhence SOLlth 61 °12'45" East, 54 65 feet; 
thence South 64°56'20" East. 41.65 feer to the East line of SectlDn 21; 
thence leaving said right-of-way along said Section hne South 00°19'03" East, 
33 2U feeL to the: Sou~h nght-of-way of Apple Blossom Road; 
{hence cominumg along said right-of-way the following courses and distance~ 
thence North 64°56'20" West, 56.86 feet; 
thence Norrh 61 °12'45" West, 56.28 feet; 
thence North 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
thence: Norrh 50°55' 03" West, 165.66 feet; 
thence 104.52 feet along a curve to Lhe left having a radillS 0[60.06 feet and a 
long chord which bears South 79u 4J '04" West, 91.82 feet; 
thence Somh 26°21 '12" West, 4099 feel, 
thence South 18°35'46" West, 163.79 feet; 
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thence 244.25 feeT along a curve to the left, having a radius 0[720.23 feel, and a 
long chord thaI bears South 12°49' 18" West, 243.09 fec:l to the: South hne of Secrion 
21 ; 
thence leaving said righr-of-way Westerly <liang said Section line South 
890 27'43" West, 15.Q3 feer to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 0.704 acres, more or less. 
END OF DESCRIPTlON 
Prepared by: 
J-U-B ENGINEERS, Inc. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P.LS. 
RMH!l3I.C 
r \f'ruJ.;cl;120·0 ... "O&7 Weel\:;·l'>lu~'um Mtflfl:llon'UI!l-'<I) .. c~SCI11~nt.O()C 
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IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff / Respondent, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and 
BRENDA 1. LAWRENCE, husband 
Aand wife, 
Defendants / Appellate, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT 
38300-2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of [daho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
as, and is a true, full and COITect record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. I further certify that exhibits were nor offered in this casco 
1 certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the 
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out oftowl1, 
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on the ~ day of Februarv, 2011. 
I do further certify that the CJerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Kootenai County, Idaho this 11 TH day February, 2011. 
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CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
----~-----=~~~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
